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PREMARITAL AGREEMENTS IN MONTANA
Bruce B. Barrett*
I. INTRODUCTION
Attorneys are often approached by clients, generally of two
types, who seek premarital agreements.1 First, older persons mar-
rying for a second time after the death of their first spouses may
seek a contract to reserve their estates for children of their first
marriage. 2 Second, young professional couples with independent
careers may also seek such agreements.' Further, the national in-
crease in the number of divorces has motivated other couples to
settle financial matters before entering into marriage.'
Attorneys found it difficult in the past to assure clients of the
durability and enforceability of premarital agreements 5 as, before
1975, no comprehensive Montana statute expressly authorized
such agreements.' Additionally, the few court decisions in Mon-
tana which addressed premarital agreements failed to rule on the
ultimate question of the enforceability of such agreements.7
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA), adopted by
the legislature in 1975, was the first express statutory validation of
premarital agreements.8 This act, however, failed to address the is-
sue of the durability and enforceability of premarital contracts. It
* J.D., University of Wyoming College of Law, 1975. Mr. Barrett, admitted to practice
in Montana, Wyoming, Nevada and California, is the director of ASUM Legal Services at
the University of Montana. He is also an Adjunct Faculty member at the University of
Montana School of Law.
1. This article does not address creation of marriage settlement agreements or cohabi-
tation contracts such as that litigated in Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134
Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976). West, The Do's and Donts of Antenuptial Agreements, 61-2 FLA. B.J.
47, 47 (1987).
2. Thomas, The Tax Consequences of Antenuptial Agreements, 32-5 PRAC. LAW. 13,
13 (1986).
3. Dulaney & Jonkel, Premarital Contracts: An Overview of Their Content and Valid-
ity, MONT. LAW., Sept. 1980, at 5.
4. West, supra note 1, at 47. See also Clark, Antenuptial Contracts, 50 U. CoLo. L.
REv. 141 (1979).
5. Note, Gross v. Gross, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 235, 235-36 (1986). See also Dulaney &
Jonkel, supra note 3, at 6.
6. In 1975 the Montana Legislature passed the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
(UMDA) codified as MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-4-101 to -225 (1987). But see MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 40-2-301 (1987).
7. Stefonick v. Stefonick, 118 Mont. 486, 167 P.2d 848 (1946); Hannon v. Hannon, 46
Mont. 253, 127 P. 466 (1912) (upholding contract provision waiving dower); In re Herzog's
Estate, 162 Mont. 410, 513 P.2d 9 (1973). See also Note, The Doctrine of Incorporation by
Reference: In re Herzog's Estate, 35 MONT. L. REv. 376 (1974).
8. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-202(1) (1975).
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thus provided little assurance to clients who feared that their pre-
marital agreements were not worth the paper they were written
on.9 In response to this uncertainty, the Montana Legislature in
1987 adopted the comprehensive Uniform Premarital Agreement
Act. 10 Practitioners now find an entirely new situation as the 1987
act mandates enforcement of premarital agreements, in addition to
encouraging their use.
This article discusses the development of Montana premarital
agreement law before and following adoption of the Uniform Pre-
marital Agreement Act. It then provides basic guidelines for prac-
titioners to follow when drafting or challenging such agreements.
II. MONTANA PREMARITAL AGREEMENT LAW PRIOR TO 1987
The first Montana statute expressly recognizing the validity of
contracts between husband and wife was enacted in 1895." This
statute provides in part that either husband or wife may enter into
any engagement or transaction with the other respecting prop-
erty. 2 A literal reading of this statute suggests it applies only to
contracts entered into during marriage, not before. The Montana
Supreme Court, however, interpreted this and similar statutes as
authorizing prospective spouses to contract with one another re-
garding future property rights.' But in practice, the court rarely
recognized the validity of premarital agreements. When it did rec-
ognize them, the court failed to address the issue of the ultimate
enforceability of premarital agreements.'4 In fact, the same deci-
sion which first acknowledged the validity of premarital agree-
ments voided the actual agreement involved on policy grounds.'
This recognition of the validity of premarital agreements with-
out a clear determination of when and how courts would enforce
such agreements, led to extensive litigation. For example, in the
9. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-202(1) (1975).
10. For complete text of the act with commissioner's comments see UNIF. PREMARITAL
AGREEMENT ACT § 1-13, 9B U.L.A. 369-80 (1986) (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-2-601
to -610 (1987)).
11. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-301 (1987). History: Enacted Civ. CODE § 214 (1895); re-
enacted REV. CODE § 3694 (1907); re-enacted MONT. REV. CODE § 5786 (1921); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 158 (1872); re-enacted MONT. REV. CODE § 5786 (1935); MONT. REV. CODE § 36-105 (1947).
12. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-301 (1987).
13. Stefonick, 118 Mont. at 498, 167 P.2d at 854.
14. In In re Herzog's Estate, 162 Mont. 410, 513 P.2d 9 (1973), the Montana Supreme
Court recognized a premarital agreement, and incorporated it by reference into a will. Here
too, the court made no ruling as to the overall validity of the premarital agreement. Id. at
412, 513 P.2d at 10.
15. Stefonick, 118 Mont. at 500, 167 P.2d at 855.
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Ohio case of Gross v. Gross,'6 a couple entered into a premarital
agreement which established the amount of alimony the wife
would receive at the time of separation or divorce.1 7 The trial court
granted a divorce,' 8 and enforced the premarital agreement after
concluding that the parties had entered into the agreement fairly.'9
The intermediate state appellate court reversed, holding that a
premarital agreement should not be enforceable by a party "at
fault" in the dissolution action.20 The Ohio Supreme Court in turn
reversed the appellate court decision and held that the premarital
agreement was enforceable because it was fairly and properly
formed.2 The court, however, permitted the trial court to reform
the alimony provision which was unconscionable as of the time of
the divorce.22 A number of cases follow this extensive litigatory
pattern with varying results.23
The Montana Legislature adopted the UMDA in 1975, thereby
joining the courts in expressly recognizing the validity of premari-
tal agreements.24 The UMDA property provisions expressly re-
quired courts to consider any premarital agreements, as well as a
number of other factors, when apportioning the property of the
parties in a dissolution action.25 The statute, however, merely re-
quired the courts to consider such agreements, not to enforce
them. The district courts, thus, retained broad discretion when ap-
portioning the property of parties.26
16. 11 Ohio St. 3d 99, 464 N.E.2d 500 (1984), appealed, 23 Ohio App. 3d 172, 492
N.E.2d 476, cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1975 (1986).
17. Gross, 11 Ohio St. 3d at 102, 464 N.E.2d at 503.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. (the husband's cruelty during the marriage constituted the fault in this case).
21. Id. at 107, 464 N.E.2d at 508.
22. Id. at 107, 464 N.E.2d at 509.
23. See Posner v. Posner, 257 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1972), appealed 315 So. 2d 175 (Fla.
1975) (involved a premarital agreement which was eventually voided by the court due to
changed conditions after the marriage); Hill v. Hill, 356 N.W.2d 49 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)
(involved a premarital agreement which was generally upheld in spite of error in the agree-
ment's financial disclosures, and the fact both parties were represented by the same attor-
ney when the agreement was drawn; the agreement's waiver of the wife's maintenance, how-
ever, was found unconscionable); Norris v. Norris, 419 A.2d 982 (D.C. Ct. App. 1980)
(involved a premarital agreement which the court failed to enforce due to lack of full disclo-
sure and lack of a voluntary execution of the agreement by the wife); In re Marriage of
Burgess, 138 Ill. App. 3d 13, 485 N.E.2d 504 (1985) (involved total enforcement of a premar-
ital agreement, including its elimination of spousal maintenance, even though a change in
economic fortune of the wife had occurred during the marriage).
24. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-4-101 to -225 (1987).
25. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-202 (1985).
26. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-202(1) (1987) provides in part that the court shall "finally
equitably apportion between the parties the property and assets belonging to either or both,
however and whenever acquired and whether the title thereto is in the name of the husband
3
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The Montana Supreme Court upheld this broad discretion in
In re Marriage of Keepers.2 7 Keepers involved a husband's appeal
from a district court judgment equally dividing the assets of the
parties, despite the marriage's short duration (four years) and the
husband's contribution of a larger share of the pre- and post-mari-
tal property.2" The Montana Supreme Court upheld the district
court's equal division. The court reasoned that the factors outlined
in the UMDA, including consideration of premarital agreements,
were not exclusive considerations for property apportionment.2 9 To
promote and ensure an equitable division of property, the Mon-
tana Legislature"0 and Supreme Court"1 mandated only considera-
tion of, not compliance with, premarital agreements. This uncer-
tain situation set the stage for legislative consideration of an act
mandating recognition and enforcement of premarital agreements.
III. THE UNIFORM PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT
The Montana Legislature finally addressed the question of the
enforceability of premarital contracts in 1987. In passing Senate
Bill 225, the legislature adopted in its entirety the Uniform Pre-
marital Agreement Act (UPAA),32 thereby joining national efforts
to make uniform premarital agreement laws from state to state.33
After adopting the UPAA, the legislature amended the
UMDA, removing premarital agreements from the list of factors
courts merely had to consider when apportioning property.34 Now,
when premarital agreements exist, courts must enforce them as
provided in the UPAA. 3
The UPAA covers premarital agreements "between prospec-
tive spouses made in contemplation of marriage and to be effective
upon marriage."3 6 The only formal requirement is that such agree-
ments be in writing. The UPAA does not require the parties to
or wife or both."
27. - Mont. -, 691 P.2d 810 (1984).
28. Id. at __, 691 P.2d at 811.
29. Id. at __, 691 P.2d at 813.
30. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-202(1) (1975).
31. In re Marriage of Keepers, - Mont. -, 691 P.2d 810 (1984).
32. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-601 to -610 (1987).
33. For complete text of the Act with commissioner's comments see UNIF. PREMARITAL
AGREEMENT ACT § 1-13, 9B U.L.A. 369-80 (1986). The National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws promulgated this act in 1986 and recommended it for passage by
the states.
34. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-202 (1987).
35. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-202(5) (1987).
36. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-603(1) (1987).
1988]
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give consideration for the agreements to be enforceable. 7 Once the
parties have entered into such an enforceable premarital agree-
ment, they are then free to amend or revoke it-again, without
consideration. 38
The Act authorizes agreements which extend to a broad vari-
ety of issues. The parties may contract regarding "the rights and
obligations of each of the parties in any of the property of either or
both of them, whenever and wherever acquired or located. '3 They
may contract for the disposition of property in the event of separa-
tion, marital dissolution or death. Also they may contract for elimi-
nation or provision of spousal support and for the making of a
"will, trust, or other arrangement to carry out the provisions of the
agreement."' The Act further allows parties to contract for "any
other matter.' '41 Consequently, parties seeking an enforceable pre-
marital agreement will find that the Act allows them to contract
for nearly all matters, except those expressly prohibited by the
UPAA.
The Act expressly prohibits only a few provisions. The Act
specifically prohibits provisions which adversely affect the right of
child support 42 or which will eliminate or modify spousal support
to such an extent that a party will be eligible for public assistance
at the time of separation or dissolution.'3 The Act also prohibits
provisions which violate public policy or provide for violation of
criminal statutes."
The critical section of the Premarital Agreement Act is the
section on enforcement, which provides only two limited grounds
for challenging enforceability. 4 First, a party may challenge the
agreement's enforceability for lack of voluntary execution.46 Sec-
ond, a party may challenge premarital agreements if they are un-
conscionable.' 7 To challenge the unconscionability of the agree-
ment, however, it must have been unconscionable at the time the
parties executed it, as opposed to becoming unconscionable
through circumstances. 48 Yet, proof of the agreement's unconscio-
37. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-604 (1987).
38. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-607 (1987).
39. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-605(l)(a) (1987).
40. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-605(1) (1987).
41. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-605(1)(h) (1987).
42. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-605(2) (1987).
43. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-608(2) (1987).
44. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-605(1)(h) (1987).
45. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-608(1)(a), (b) (1987).
46. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-608(1)(a) (1987).
47. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-608(1)(b) (1987).
48. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-608(1)(b) (1987).
[Vol. 49
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nability at the time of execution will not, by itself, prevent enforce-
ment of a premarital agreement."9 The non-challenging party also
must have failed to provide a "fair and reasonable disclosure of the
property and financial obligations,"5 unless the challenging party
voluntarily signed a written waiver of any right to such disclo-
sure.5 1 The party seeking to prevent enforcement of an unconscion-
able agreement also must lack actual knowledge of the other
party's property holdings and financial obligations. 52 These exten-
sive UPAA requirements, which are a prerequisite to any challenge
of the unconscionability of a premarital agreement, indicate that
parties may now voluntarily choose to enter into unconscionable
agreements, and the courts are less likely to save them from a "bad
bargain."
IV. PRACTICE CONSIDERATIONS
A. Challenges to the Enforceability of Premarital Agreements
Now that premarital agreements are enforceable,53 attorneys
must develop appropriate practices for drafting agreements that
will withstand challenges, and also techniques for challenging the
enforceability of such agreements. Challenges based upon volunta-
riness may prove much more fruitful than those based on uncon-
scionability, even though the traditional basis for challenging pre-
marital agreements has been unconscionability." The Act,
however, strictly limits the conditions under which a party may
challenge the enforceability of a premarital agreement and thereby
defeat it.55 Mere unfairness will not save a person from an exe-
cuted premarital contract. The challenging party must prove either
lack of disclosure or the existence of a waiver, and also prove lack
of any actual knowledge of the other party's financial assets and
obligations.56 Unconscionability must be determined by the court
as a matter of law. 7
Courts in other jurisdictions have frequently addressed the is-
sue of what constitutes a voluntary decision to enter into a premar-
49. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-608(1)(b) (1987).
50. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-608(l)(b)(i) (1987).
51. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-608(1)(b)(ii) (1987).
52. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-608(1)(b)(iii) (1987).
53. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-608(1)(a), (b) (1987).
54. Gross v. Gross, 11 Ohio St. 3d 99, 109, 464 N.E.2d 500, 509 (1986).
55. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-608(1)(b) (1987).
56. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-608(1)(b) (1987).
57. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-608(3) (1987).
1988]
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ital agreement.58 The Florida case of Plant v. Plant59 illustrates
what constitutes a voluntary agreement. In Plant, the groom
presented a premarital agreement to the bride close to the wedding
day.60 Further, the bride signed the agreement without benefit of
independent legal counsel and without adequate legal advice.61 The
court voided this premarital agreement after holding it was not
voluntarily entered into by both parties.2
Another Florida case, Lutgert v. Lutgert," provides a more
dramatic example of what constitutes non-voluntary formation of a
premarital agreement. In Lutgert, the husband presented the wife
with the agreement less than twenty-four hours before the wed-
ding, and after extensive plans were made, the guests invited, the
honeymoon planned and the rings purchased." The wife initially
refused, but in the face of the husband's threat to cancel the wed-
ding, the wife signed the agreement.6 The wife challenged the
agreement during the divorce proceeding some ten years later, and
the court overturned it as a product of coercion.66
The Montana Supreme Court has also considered challenges
to marital and post-marital contracts based upon involuntary for-
mation. These cases indicate what factors may constitute a basis
for challenging premarital agreements. In the 1984 case of In re
Marriage of Myers,67 the wife brought the vast majority of assets
to the marriage.68 The husband later separated from the wife and
agreed to a reconciliation only if the wife would sign a marital
property agreement giving him half interest in all marital prop-
erty. 9 Upon dissolution, the court refused to enforce the
agreement.7 0
The Montana Supreme Court has held that the assistance of
independent counsel for each party drafting a marital agreement is
a critical factor to a later determination of the voluntariness of the
58. West, supra note 1, at 49.
59. 320 So. 2d 455 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
60. Id. at 457.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 457.
63. 338 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
64. Id. at 1113-14.
65. Id. at 1114.
66. Id. at 1116-17.
67. - Mont. __, 682 P.2d 718 (1984).
68. Id. at -, 682 P.2d at 719.
69. Id. at -, 682 P.2d at 720.
70. Id. at -, 682 P.2d at 721. In voiding the agreement, the court also noted that
the marriage was of short duration and that the dissolution was the husband's fifth and the
wife's third. Id. at __, 682 P.2d at 722.
[Vol. 49
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agreement. For example, in In re Marriage of Lawrence,1 the trial
court enforced what it would normally have considered an uncon-
scionable separation agreement 7 2 because it found the wife had
been represented by independent counsel, knew of the assets in-
volved, and chose to overrule her counsel's advice that she could
recoup more of the assets at trial than through the agreement7 3
The Montana Supreme Court stated it would uphold the trial
court's decision because the totality of the circumstances sur-
rounding the formation of the agreement supported the holding
that no evidence of duress or coercion existed.7" The wife con-
tended that she had ignored her attorney's advice due to the hus-
band's "threats and importunities. ' 75 The court nevertheless up-
held the agreement, noting that divorces often include some
trauma, but that the trauma of divorce was not enough to negate
voluntariness. 76
In Winters v. Winters7 7 the court discussed the level of
threats required to establish involuntary entry into a marital
agreement and indicated which threats were insufficient to negate
voluntariness. In Winters, the wife discovered her husband's extra-
marital affair and threatened to "drag [his] lover's name through
the mud" unless cash payments to the wife were included in the
separation agreement.78 The court upheld the agreement after
holding that this threat did not vitiate the husband's consent.79
In sum, challenges to premarital agreements are likely to be
most successful when the other party drafted all the terms, pro-
duced the agreement shortly before the wedding, and then gave
the other party a "take it or leave it" option.80 The fact that a
spouse has no independent counsel also strengthens a challenge to
the voluntariness of the contract.8 1 These factors open the door for
challenges, but challengers should realize both the serious implica-
tions of premarital agreements and the strong indications that
courts will enforce them.8
71. 197 Mont. 262, 642 P.2d 1043 (1982).
72. Id. at 265, 642 P.2d at 1045.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 270, 642 P.2d at 1047.
75. Id. at 271, 642 P.2d at 1048.
76. Id. at 273, 642 P.2d at 1049.
77. 188 Mont. 43, 610 P.2d 1165 (1980).
78. Id. at 45, 610 P.2d at 1167-68.
79. Id. at 46, 610 P.2d at 1168.
80. West, supra note 1, at 50.
81. See, e.g., Lawrence, 197 Mont. 262, 642 P.2d 1043.
82. West, supra note 1, at 50. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-608 (1987); Lawrence, 197
Mont. at 273, 642 P.2d at 1049; Winters, 188 Mont. at 46, 610 P.2d at 1168.
19881
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B. Drafting Premarital Agreements to Prevent Challenges
To insure later enforceability, attorneys should draft agree-
ments with care. Each spouse should have independent counsel, al-
though the act does not require it, as this may negate a later claim
of involuntary formation. 3 A contribution by both parties to the
terms of the agreement would provide further evidence of the vol-
untary execution of the agreement.8 4
Full disclosure of the parties' property and financial holdings
is not required under the Act.8 The Act also provides for partial
disclosure of assets and liabilities, and this may meet the needs of
the non-disclosing party.8 6 Whether the parties choose full or par-
tial disclosure, the attorney should draft detailed listings of
properties and financial obligations, which may then be attached
as exhibits to the agreement and signed by both parties. Addition-
ally, if the parties opt against either full or partial disclosure, they
may wish to sign a waiver of full disclosure. This waiver should be
clear and concise to avoid later challenges."
The attorney should consult available agreement checklists88
and source materials containing sample contract provisions, 89 re-
membering that the new Act provides parties with a broad range of
contract options9 ° which may entail significant estate and tax con-
sequences.91 The general practitioner should thus also keep basic
estate and tax aspects in mind when drafting agreements.92 Cer-
tainly there will be times when outside consultation with estate or
tax experts will be advisable.
Clients sometimes seek contractual provisions regarding per-
sonal aspects of their upcoming marital relationship.93 These pro-
visions may range from those providing for division of household
duties, to regulation of sexual conduct. Attorneys should advise
their clients that such provisions are not expressly prohibited by
the Act, but that they may have little legal value. 4 However, there
are times when discussion and clarification of these issues may
83. Lawrence, 197 Mont. at 273, 642 P.2d at 1043.
84. West, supra note 1, at 50.
85. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-608(l)(b)(ii), (iii) (1987).
86. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-608(1)(b)(ii) (1987).
87. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-608(1)(b)(ii) (1987).
88. See, e.g., LEGAL FORMS 2D, Husband and Wife § 139.11 (1985).
89. See, e.g., D. PATTERSON, MONTANA FAMILY LAW PLEADING & PRACTICE FORMS AND
AGREEMENTS (1986).
90. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-2-601 to -610 (1987).
91. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-605(1)(e) (1987); Thomas, supra note 2, at 13.
92. See Thomas, supra note 2, at 13.
93. Dulaney & Jonkel, supra note 3, at 6.
94. Id.
[Vol. 49
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benefit the parties and help them achieve mutual expectations."5
V. CONCLUSION
Most couples do not seek premarital agreements. In part this
is due to a popular distaste for such agreements. Some feel these
agreements demean the traditional sanctity of marriage and ques-
tion the underlying trust and commitment of the parties. Yet mar-
riage constitutes an agreement with far reaching consequences
should a dissolution occur and the parties find themselves without
benefit of a premarital agreement. Were the ramifications of a di-
vorce placed in contract form, potential spouses would no doubt be
taken by surprise when asked to sign.96
Couples who do choose to vary from traditional marital and
dissolution ramifications finally are able to do so with predictabil-
ity because of extensive developments in premarital agreement
laws. Contracts facilitating and encouraging divorce no longer are
prohibited. Couples are now free to choose options that fit their
particular needs and desires, which may include a desire to unite
emotionally in marriage, but remain separate financially. The en-
forcement and use of premarital agreements actually may en-
courage marriage in these complex times of non-marital cohabita-
tion and economical independence, by eliminating much of the
economic uncertainty associated with a dissolution.
95. Parties to premarital agreements will often be surprised at how little they know
about each other's attitudes and expectations.
96. Weitzman, Legal Relationship of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CAL. L. REV.
1169, 1170 (1974).
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